The American Indian as Participant in the Civil War

By Annie Heloise Abel, Ph.D.

Professor of History, Smith College

1919

IV. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE FIRST INDIAN EXPEDITION

Among the manifold requests put forward by the refugees, none was so
insistent, none so dolefully sincere, as the one for means to return
home. It is a mistake to suppose that the Indian, traditionally
laconic and stoical, is without family affection and without that
noblest of human sentiments, love of country. The United States
government has, indeed, proceeded upon the supposition that he is
destitute of emotions, natural to his more highly civilized white
brother, but its files are full to overflowing with evidences to the
contrary. Everywhere among them the investigator finds the exile's
lament. The red man has been banished so often from familiar and
greatly loved scenes that it is a wonder he has taken root anywhere
and yet he has. Attachment to the places where the bones of his people
lie is with him the most constant of experiences and his cry for those
same sacred places is all the stronger and the more sorrowful because
it has been persistently ignored by the white man.

The southern Indians had not been so very many years in the Indian
Territory, most of them not more than the span of one generation, but
Indian Territory was none the less home. If the refugees could only
get there again, they were confident all would be well with them. In
Kansas, they were hungry, afflicted with disease, and dying daily by
the score.[193] Once at home

[Footnote 193: And yet they did have their amusements. Their days of
exile were not filled altogether with bitterness. Coffin, in a letter
to the (cont.)]

all the ills of the flesh would disappear and lost friends be
recovered. The exodus had separated them cruelly from each other.
There were family and tribal encampments within the one large
encampment,[194] it is true, but there were also widely isolated
groups, scattered indiscriminately across two hundred miles of bleak
and lonely prairie, and no amount of philanthropic effort on the part
of the government agents could mitigate the misery arising therefrom
or bring the groups together. The task had been early abandoned as,
under the circumstances, next to impossible; but the refugees went on
begging for its accomplishment, notwithstanding that they had
neither the physical strength nor the means to render any assistance
themselves. Among them the wail of the bereaved vied in tragic cadence
with the sad inquiry for the missing.

When Dole arrived at Leavenworth the latter part of January,
representatives of the loyal Indians interviewed him and received
assurances, honest and well-meant at the time given, that an early
return to Indian Territory would be made possible. Lane, likewise
interviewed,[195] was similarly encouraging and had every reason to
be; for was not his Indian brigade in process of formation? Much
cheered and even exhilarated in spirit, the Indians went away to
endure and to wait. They had great confidence in Lane's power to
accomplish; but, as the days and the weeks passed and he did not come,
they grew tired of waiting. The waiting

[Footnote 193: (cont.) _Daily Conservative_, published April 16,
1862, gives, besides a rather gruesome account of their diseases, some
interesting details of their camp life.]

[Footnote 194: On their division into tribal encampments, see Kile
to Dole, April 10, 1862 [Indian Office General Files, _Southern
Superintendency_, 1859-1862, K 119 of 1862].]

[Footnote 195: They had their interview with Lane at the Planters'
House while they were awaiting the arrival of Dole. Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la
(Crazy Dog) and a Seminole chief, Aluktustenuke (Major Potatoes) were
among them [_Daily Conservative_, January 28, February 8, 1862].]

[Illustration: PORTRAIT OF COLONEL W.A. PHILLIPS]

seemed so hopeless to them miserable, so endlessly long. Primitive as
they were, they simply could not understand why the agents of a great
government could not move more expeditiously. The political and
military aspects of the undertaking, involved in their return home,
were unknown to them and, if known, would have been uncomprehended.
Then, too, the vacillation of the government puzzled them. They became
suspicious; for they had become acquainted, through the experience of
long years, with the white man's bad faith and they had nothing to go
upon that would counteract the influence of earlier distrust. And so
it happened, that, as the weary days passed and Lane's brigade did not
materialize, every grievance that loomed up before them took the shape
of a disappointed longing for home.

So poignant was their grief at the continued delay that they despaired
of ever getting the help promised and began to consider how they could
contrive a return for themselves. And yet, quite independent of Lane's
brigade, there had been more than one movement initiated in their
behalf. The desire to recover lost ground in Indian Territory, under
the pretext of restoring the fugitives, aroused the fighting instinct
of many young men in southern Kansas and several irregular expeditions
were projected.[196] Needless to say they came to nothing. In point of
fact, they never really developed, but died almost with the thought.
There was no adequate equipment for them and the longer the delay,
the more necessary became equipment; because after the Battle of Pea
Ridge, Pike's brigade had been set free to operate, if it so willed,
on the Indian Territory border.

[Footnote 196: In addition to those referred to in documents already
cited, the one, projected by Coffin's son and a Captain Brooks, is
noteworthy. It is described in a letter from Coffin to Dole, March 24,
1862.]

Closely following upon the Federal success of March 6 to 8, came
numerous changes and readjustments in the Missouri-Kansas commands;
but they were not so much the result of that success as they were
a part of the general reorganization that was taking place in the
Federal service incident to the more efficient war administration of
Secretary Stanton. By order of March 11, three military departments
were arranged for, the Department of the Potomac under McClellan,
that of the Mountain under Fremont, and that of the Mississippi under
Halleck. The consolidation of Hunter's Department of Kansas with
Halleck's Department of Missouri was thus provided for and had long
been a consummation devoutly to be wished.[197] Both were naturally
parts of the same organic whole when regarded from a military point
of view. Neither could be operated upon independently of the other.
Moreover, both were infested by political vultures. In both, the army
discipline was, in consequence, bad; that is, if it could be said to
be in existence at all. If anything, Kansas was in a worse state than
Missouri. Her condition, as far as the military forces were concerned,
had not much improved since Hunter first took command and it was then
about the worst that could possibly be imagined. Major Halpine's
description[198] of it, made by him in his capacity as assistant
adjutant-general, officially to Halleck, is anything but flattering.
Hunter was probably well rid of his job and Halleck, whom Lincoln much
admired because he was "wholly for the service,"[199] had asked for
the entire command.[200]

[Footnote 197: Halleck, however, had not desired the inclusion of
Kansas in the contemplated new department because he thought that
state had only a remote connection with present operations.]

[Footnote 198: _Official Records_, vol. viii, 615-617.]

[Footnote 199: Thayer, _Life and Letters of John Hay_, vol. i,
127-128.]

[Footnote 200: Badeau, _Military History of U.S. Grant_, vol. i,
53, _footnote_.]

Halleck's plans for remodeling the constituent elements of his
department were made with a thorough comprehension of the difficulties
confronting him. It is not surprising that they brought General Denver
again to the fore. Hunter's troubles had been bred by local politics.
That Halleck well knew; but he also knew that Indian relations were a
source of perplexity and that there was no enemy actually in Kansas
and no enemy worth considering that would threaten her, provided her
own jay-hawking hordes could be suppressed. Her problems were chiefly
administrative.[201] For the work to be done, Denver seemed the
fittest man available and, on the nineteenth, he, having previously
been ordered to report to Halleck for duty,[202] was assigned[203] to
the command of a newly-constituted District of Kansas, from which
the troops,[204] who were guarding the only real danger zone,
the southeastern part of the state, were expressly excluded. The
hydra-headed evil of the western world then asserted itself, the
meddling, particularistic spoils system, with the result that Lane and
Pomeroy, unceasingly vigilant whenever and wherever what they regarded
as their preserves were likely to be encroached upon, went to
President Lincoln and protested against the preferment of Denver.[205]
Lincoln weakly yielded and wired to Halleck to suspend

[Footnote 201: Halleck to Stanton, March 28, 1862, _Official
Records_, vol. viii, 647-648.]

[Footnote 202:--Ibid., 612]

[Footnote 203:--Ibid., 832.]

[Footnote 204: Those troops, about five thousand, were left under
the command of George W. Deitzler, colonel of the First Kansas
(Ibid., 614), a man who had become prominent before the war in
connection with the Sharpe's rifles episode (Spring, _Kansas_,
60) and whose appointment as an Indian agent, early in 1861, had been
successfully opposed by Lane (Robinson, _Kansas Conflict_, 458).
There will be other occasions to refer to him in this narrative. He is
believed to have held the secret that induced Lane to commit suicide
in 1866 [Ibid., 457-460].]

[Footnote 205: Stanton to Halleck, March 26, 1862 [_Official
Records_, vol. liii, supplement, 516].]

the order for Denver's assignment to duty until further notice.[206]
Stanton, to whom Halleck applied[207] for an explanation,
deprecated[208] the political interference of the Kansas senators and
the influence it had had with the chief executive, but he, too, had to
give way. So effective was the Lane-Pomeroy objection to Denver that
even a temporary[209] appointment of him, resorted[210] to by Halleck
because of the urgent need of some sort of a commander in Kansas, was
deplored by the president.[211] Denver was then sent to the place
where his abilities and his experience would be better appreciated, to
the southernmost part of the state, the hinterland of the whole Indian
country.[212] Official indecision and personal envy pursued him
even there, however, and it was not long before he was called
eastward.[213] The man who succeeded him in command of the District of
Kansas[214] was one who proved to be his ranking officer[215] and his
rival, Brigadier-general S.D. Sturgis. Blunt succeeded him at Fort
Scott.

[Footnote 206: Lincoln to Halleck, March 21, 1862, _Official
Records_, vol. liii, supplement, 516.]

[Footnote 207: Halleck to Stanton, March 26, 1862, Ibid.]

[Footnote 208: "Deprecated" is, perhaps, too mild a word to describe
Stanton's feeling in the matter. Adjutant-general Hitchcock is
authority for the statement that Stanton threatened "to leave the
office" should the "enforcement" of any such order, meaning the
non-assignment of Denver and the appointment of a man named Davis
[Davies?], believed by Robinson to be a relative of Lane [_Kansas
Conflict_, 446], be attempted [Hitchcock to Halleck, March 22,
1862, _Official Records_, vol. viii, 832-833].]

[Footnote 209:--Ibid., vol. liii, supplement, 519.]

[Footnote 210:--Ibid., vol. viii, 647-648.]

[Footnote 211:--Ibid., vol. liii, supplement, 519.]

[Footnote 212: Concerning the work, mapped out for Denver, see Halleck
to Sturgis, April 6, 1862 [_Official Records_, vol. viii, 668]
and Halleck to Stanton, April 7, 1862 [Ibid., 672].]

[Footnote 213: May 14, 1862 [Ibid., vol. iii, part i,
supplement, 249].]

[Footnote 214:--Ibid., vol. liii, supplement, 520.]

[Footnote 215: "It is stated that the commission of Gen. Sturgis is
dated April 10 and that of Gen. Denver Aug. 14 and consequently Gen.
Sturgis is the ranking officer in this military District."--_Daily
Conservative_, April 10, 1862.]

The elimination of Kansas as a separate department marked the revival
of interest in an Indian expedition. The cost of supporting so huge
a body of refugees had really become a serious proposition and, as
Colonel C. R. Jennison[216] had once remarked, it would be economy to
enlist them.[217] Congress had provided that certain Indian annuity
money might be diverted to their maintenance,[218] but that fund was
practically exhausted before the middle of March.[219] As already
observed, the refugees very much wished to assist in the recovery of
Indian Territory.[220] In fact they were determined to go south if the
army went and their disappointment was likely to be most keen in the
event of its and their not going.[221] It was under circumstances such
as these that Commissioner Dole recommended to Secretary Smith, March
13, 1862, that he

Procure an order from the War Department detailing two
Regiment of Volunteers from Kansas to go with the Indians
to their homes and to remain there for their protection as long
(as) may be necessary, also to furnish two thousand stand of
arms and ammunition to be placed in the hands of the loyal
Indians.

Dole's unmistakable earnestness carried the day. Within less than a
week there had been promised[222] him all that he had asked for and
more, an

[Footnote 216: Jennison, so says the _Daily Conservative_,
March 25, 1862, had been ordered with the First Cavalry to repair to
Humboldt at the time the Indian Expedition was under consideration the
first of the year and was brevetted acting brigadier for the purpose
of furthering Dole's intentions.]

[Footnote 217: _Daily Conservative_, February 18, 1862.]

[Footnote 218: _Congressional Globe_, 37th congress, second
session, part i, 835, 878.]

[Footnote 219: Dole to Smith, March 13, 1862 [Indian Office _Report
Book_, no. 12, 331-332].]

[Footnote 220: Coffin to Dole, March 3, 1862 [Ibid.,
Consolidated Files, _Southern Superintendency_, C 1544 of 1862;
_Letters Registered_, no. 58].]

[Footnote 221: _Daily Conservative_, March 5, 1862.]

[Footnote 222: Commissioner of Indian Affairs, _Report_, 1862,
148.]

expeditionary force of two white regiments and two[223] thousand
Indians, appropriately armed. To expedite matters and to obviate any
difficulties that might otherwise beset the carrying out of the plan,
a semi-confidential agent, on detail from the Indian Office, was sent
west with despatches[224] to Halleck and with an order[225] from the
Ordnance Department for the delivery, at Fort Leavenworth, of the
requisite arms. The messenger was Judge James Steele, who, upon
reaching St. Louis, had already discouraging news to report to Dole.
He had interviewed Halleck and had found him in anything but a helpful
mood, notwithstanding that he must, by that time, have received and
reflected upon the following communication from the War Department:

WAR DEPARTMENT,

WASHINGTON CITY, D. C, March 19, 1862.
MAJ. GEN.H.W. HALLECK,

Commanding the Department of Mississippi:

General: It is the desire of the President, on the application of the
Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, that
you should detail two regiments to act in the Indian country, with a
view to open the way for the friendly Indians who are now refugees in
Southern Kansas to return to their homes and to protect them there.
Five thousand friendly Indians will also be armed to aid in their
own protection, and you will please furnish them with necessary
subsistence.

Please report your action in the premises to this Department. Prompt
action is necessary.

By order of the Secretary of War:

L. THOMAS, Adjutant-general[226]

[Footnote 223: Two thousand was most certainly the number, although
the communication from the War Department gives it as five.]

[Footnote 224: Dole to Halleck, March 21, 1862 [Indian Office
_Letter Book_, no. 67, 516-517].]

[Footnote 225:--Ibid., 517-518.]

[Footnote 226: _Official Records_, vol. viii, 624-625.]

Steele inferred from what passed at the interview with Halleck that
the commanding general was decidedly opposed to arming Indians. Steele
found him also non-committal as to when the auxiliary force would be
available.[227] Dole's letter, with its seeming dictation as to
the choice of a commander for the expedition, may not have been to
Halleck's liking. He was himself at the moment most interested in the
suppression of guerrillas and jayhawkers, against whom sentence of
outlawry had just been passed. As it happened, that was the work in
which Dole's nominee, Colonel Robert B. Mitchell,[228] was to render
such signal service[229] and, anticipating as much, Halleck may have
objected to his being thought of for other things. Furthermore, Dole
had no right to so much as cast a doubt upon Halleck's own ability to
select a proper commander.

A little perplexed but not at all daunted by Halleck's lack of
cordiality, Steele proceeded on his journey and, arriving at
Leavenworth, presented his credentials to Captain McNutt, who was in
charge of the arsenal. Four hundred Indian rifles were at hand, ready
for him, and others expected.[230] What to do next, was the question?
Should he go on to Leroy and trust to the auxiliary force's showing up
in season or wait for it? The principal part of his mission was yet
to be executed. The Indians had to be enrolled and everything got in
train for their expedition southward. Their homes

[Footnote 227: Steele to Dole, March 27, 1862 [Indian Office General
Files, _Southern Superintendence_, 1859-1862, S 537 of 1862].]

[Footnote 228: Robert B. Mitchell was colonel, first of the Second
Kansas Infantry, then of the Second Kansas Cavalry. He raised the
former, in answer to President Lincoln's first call, 1861 [Crawford,
_Kansas in the Sixties_, 20], chiefly in Linn County, and the
latter in 1862.]

[Footnote 229: Connelley, _Quantrilt and the Border Wars_, 236
ff.]

[Footnote 230: Steele to Dole, March 26, 1862 [Indian Office General
Files, _Southern Superintendence_, 1859-1862].]

once recovered, they were to be left in such shape as to be able to
"protect and defend themselves."[231]

Halleck's preoccupation, prejudice, or whatever it was that prevented
him from giving any satisfaction to Steele soon yielded, as all
things sooner or later must, to necessity; but not to the extent of
sanctioning the employment of Indians in warfare except as against
other "Indians or in defense of their own territory and homes." The
Pea Ridge atrocities were probably still fresh in his mind. On the
fifth of April, he instructed[232] General Denver with a view to
advancing, at last, the organization of the Indian expedition and
Denver, Coffin, and Steele forthwith exerted all their energies in
cooeperating effort[233]. Some time was spent in inspecting arms[234]
but, on the eighth, enough for two thousand Indians went forward in
the direction of Leroy and Humboldt[235] and on the sixteenth were
delivered to the superintendent[236]. Coffin surmised that new
complications would arise as soon as the distribution began; for all
the Indians, whether they intended to enlist or not, would try to
secure guns. Nothing had yet been said about their pay and nothing
heard of an auxiliary force[237]. Again the question was, what,

[Footnote 231: Dole to Steele, March 21, 1862, Indian Office _Letter
Book_, no. 67, 508-509.]

[Footnote 232: _Official Records_, vol. viii, 665.]

[Footnote 233: Dole's name might well be added to this list; for he
had never lost his interest or relaxed his efforts. On the fifth of
April, he communicated to Secretary Smith the intelligence that he
had issued instructions to "the officers appointed to command the two
Regiments of Indians to be raised as Home Guard to report at Fort
Leavenworth to be mustered into service ... "--Indian Office _Report
Book_, no. 12, 357.]

[Footnote 234: Steele to Dole, April 7, 1862 [Ibid., General
Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862, S 538 of 1862].]

[Footnote 235: Denver to Halleck, April 8, 1862 [_Official
Records_, vol. viii, 679].]

[Footnote 236: Commissioner of Indian Affairs, _Report_, 1862,
148.]

[Footnote 237: "... I fear we shall have trouble in regard to the guns
as many will take guns that will not go and whether they will give up
their arms is doubtful. I had a long talk with Opothly-Oholo on that
point and told (cont.)]

in the event of its not appearing, should the Indian agents do?[238]

The time was propitious for starting the expedition; for not the
shadow of an enemy had been lately seen in the West, unless count be
taken of Indians returning home or small roving bands of possible
marauders that the people of all parties detested[239]. But the order
for the supplanting of Denver by Sturgis had already been issued,
April sixth[240], and Sturgis's policy was not yet

[Footnote 237: (cont.) him you could only get 2000 guns and you wanted
every one to go and an Indian with it and that if any of them got guns
that did not go they must give up their guns to those that would go
but I know enough of the Indian character to know that it will be next
thing to an impossibility to get a gun away from one when he once gets
it and I shall put off the distribution of the guns till the last
moment and it would be best to send them on a day or two before being
distributed but that would make them mad and they would not go at all
and how we are to know how many to look out for from others than those
we have here I am not able to see but we will do all that we can but
you may look out for dificulty in the matter they all seem anxious now
to go and make no objections as yet nor have they said anything about
their pay but as they were told before when we expect them to go into
the Hunter Lane expedition that they would get the same pay as white
troops and set off a part of it for their families it was so indelibly
impressed upon their minds that I fear we will have a blow up on that
score when it comes up we hear nothing yet of any troops being ordered
to this service and I very much fear they will put off the matter so
long that there will be no crop raised this season ... the mortality
amongst them is great more since warm weather has set in than during
the cold weather they foolishly physic themselves nearly to death danc
[dance] all night and then jump into the river just at daylight to
make themselves bullet proof they have followed this up now every
night for over two weeks and it has no doubt caused many deaths
Long Tiger the Uchee Chief and one of the best amongst them died
to-day--yesterday we had 7 deaths and there will not be less
to-day"--Coffin to Dole, April 7, 1862, Indian Office General Files,
_Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862, C 1578 of 1862.]

[Footnote 238: This was the query put to Dole by Steele in a letter of
the thirteenth of April, which acknowledged Dole's of the third and
ventured the opinion that Postmaster-general Blair "must be imitating
General McClellan and practicing strategy with the mails." Steele
further remarked, "Gen'l Denver, Maj. Wright and I are in the dark as
to the plans of the Indian Expedition. Gen. Denver thinks I
should proceed at once to Leroy without waiting for your
instructions."--Ibid., S 539 of 1862.]

[Footnote 239: Curtis to Halleck, April 5, 1862 [_Official
Records_, vol. viii, 662].]

[Footnote 240: Sturgis, upon the receipt of orders of this date,
assumed command of (cont.)]

known. It soon revealed itself, however, and was hostile to the whole
project that Dole had set his heart upon. Apparently that project, the
moment it had been taken up by Denver, had ceased to have any interest
for Lane on the score of its merits and had become identified with
the Robinson faction in Kansas politics. At any rate, it was the
anti-Robinson press that saw occasion for rejoicing in the complete
removal of Denver from the scene, an event which soon took place[241].

The relieving of Denver from the command of the District of Kansas
inaugurated[242] what contemporaries described as "Sturgis' military
despotism,"[243] in amplification of which it is enough to say that
it attempted the utter confounding, if not the annihilation, of the
Indian Expedition, a truly noble undertaking to be sure, considering
how much was hoped for from that expedition, how much of benefit and
measure of justice to a helpless, homeless, impoverished people and
considering, also, how much of time and thought and

[Footnote 240: (cont.) the District of Kansas; but Denver was not
called east until the fourteenth of May. On the twenty-first of April,
it was still expected that he would lead an expedition "down the
borders of Arkansas into the Indian country." [KELTON to Curtis, April
21, 1862, Ibid., vol. xiii, 364].]

[Footnote 241: The _Daily Conservative_, for instance, rejoiced
over this telegram from Sidney Clark of May 2, which gave advanced
information of Denver's approaching departure: "Conservative: The
Department of Kansas is reinstated. Gen. Blunt takes command. Denver
reports to Halleck; Sturgis here." The newspaper comment was, "We
firmly believe that a prolongation of the Denver-Sturgis political
generalship, aided as it was by the corrupt Governor of this
State, would have led to a revolution in Kansas ..."--_Daily
Conservative_, May 6, 1862.]

[Footnote 242: General Sturgis assumed command, April 10, 1862
[_Official Records_, vol. viii, 683], and Denver took temporary
charge at Fort Scott [Ibid., 668].]

[Footnote 243: Quoted from the _Daily Conservative_ of May 20;
but not with the idea of subscribing thereby to any verdict that would
bear the implication that all of Sturgis's measures were arbitrary
and wrong. Something strenuous was needed in Kansas. The arrest of
Jennison and of Hoyt [Ibid., April 19, 23, 1862] because of
their too radical anti-slavery actions was justifiable. Jennison had
disorganized his regiment in a shameful manner [Ibid., June 3,
1862].]

energy, not to mention money, had already been expended upon it.

Sturgis's policy with reference to the Indian Expedition was initiated
by an order[244], of April 25, which gained circulation as purporting
to be in conformity with instructions from the headquarters of the
Department of the Mississippi, although in itself emanating from those
of the District of Kansas. It put a summary stop to the enlistment
of Indians and threatened with arrest anyone who should disobey its
mandate. Superintendent Coffin, in his inimitable illiteracy, at once
entered protest[245] against it and coolly informed Sturgis that, in
enrolling Indians for service, he was acting under the authority, not
of the War, but of the Interior Department. At the same sitting, he
applied to Commissioner Dole for new instructions[246].

[Footnote 244: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 365.]

[Footnote 245:

LE ROY COFFEE COUNTY, KANSAS, April 29th 1862.
BRIG. GENL S.D. STURGIS, Fort Leavenworth Kansas

Dear Sir: A Special Messenger arrived here last night from Fort
Leavenworth with your orders No. 8 and contents noted. I would most
respectfully inform you that I am acting under the controle and
directions of the Interior and not of the War Department. I have
been endeavoring to the best of my humble ability to carry out the
instructions and wishes of that Department, all of which I hope will
meet your aprobation.

Your Messenger reports himself Straped, that no funds were furnished
him to pay his expenses, that he had to beg his way down here. I have
paid his bill here and furnished him with five dollars to pay his way
back. Very respectfully your Obedient Servant

W.G. COFFIN, _Sup't. of Indian Affairs_, Southern
Superintendency. [Indian Office Special Files, no. 201, _Southern
Superintendency_, C 1612 of 1862].]

[Footnote 246: LEROY COFFEY CO., KANSAS, April 29th, 1862.

SIR: Enclosed please find a communication from Brigadier General
Sturgis in regard to the organising of the Indians and my reply to the
same, the officers are here, or at least four of them. Col Furnace
Agutant Elithurp Lieutenant Wattles and Agutant Dole I need scarcely
say to you that we shall continue to act under your Instructions til
further orders, the Officers above alluded to have been untiring in
their efforts to get acquainted with and get the permanent (cont.)]

Colonel John Ritchie[247] of the inchoate Second Regiment Indian Home
Guards did the same[248].

The reestablishment[249] of the Department of Kansas, at this critical
moment, while much to be regretted as indicative of a surrender to
politicians[250] and an abandonment of the idea, so fundamentally
conducive to military success, that all parts must contribute to the
good of the whole, had one thing to commend it, it restored vigor
to the Indian Expedition. The department was reestablished, under
orders[251] of May second, with James G. Blunt in command. He entered
upon his duties, May fifth, and on that selfsame day authorized the
issue of the following most significant instructions, in toto, a
direct countermand of all that Sturgis had most prominently stood for:

[Footnote 246: (cont.) organization of the Indians under way and have
made a fine impression upon them, and I should very much regret any
failure to carry out the programe as they have been allready so
often disappointed that they have become suspicious and it all has a
tendency to lessen their confidence in us and to greatly increase
our dificulties All of which is most Respectfully Submitted by your
obedient Servant

W.G. COFFIN, Sup't of Indian Affairs. [Indian Office Special Files,
no. 201, _Southern Superintendency_, C 1612 of 1862].]

[Footnote 247: For an inferential appraisement of Ritchie's character
and abilities, see Kansas _Historical Collections_, vol. iii,
359-366.]

[Footnote 248: Ritchie to Dole, April 26, 1863 [Indian Office
Miscellaneous Files, 1858-1863].]

[Footnote 249: The reestablishment, considered in the light of the
first orders issued by Blunt, those set out here, was decidedly in
the nature of a reflection upon the reactionary policy of Halleck and
Sturgis; but Halleck had no regrets. Of Kansas, he said, "Thank God,
it is no longer under my command." [_Official Records_, vol.
xiii, 440.] Ever since the time, when he had been urged by the
administration in Washington, peculiarly sensitive to political
importunities, not to retain, outside of Kansas, the Kansas troops
if he could possibly avoid it, there had been more or less of rancor
between him and them. His opinion of them was that they were a
"humbug" [Ibid., vol. viii, 661].]

[Footnote 250: Almost simultaneously, Schofield was given independent
command in Missouri, a similar surrender to local political pressure.]

[Footnote 251: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 368-369.]

General Orders, HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF KANSAS,
No. 2. Fort Leavenworth, Kans., May 5, 1862.

I. General Orders, No. 8, dated Headquarters District of Kansas, April
25, 1862, is hereby rescinded.

II. The instructions issued by the Department at Washington to the
colonels of the two Indian regiments ordered to be raised will be
fully carried out, and the regiments will be raised with all possible
speed.

By order of Brig. Gen. James G. Blunt,[252]

THOS. MOONLIGHT, _Captain
and Assistant Adjutant-general_.[253]

The full extent, not only of Sturgis's failure to cooeperate with
the Indian Office, but also of his intention utterly to block the
organization of the Indian Expedition, is revealed in a letter[254]
from Robert W. Furnas, colonel commanding the First Regiment Indian
Home Guards, to Dole, May 4, 1862. That letter best explains itself.
It was written from Leroy, Kansas, and reads thus:

Disclaiming any idea of violating "Regulations" by an "Official
Report" to you, permit me to communicate certain facts extremely
embarrassing, which surround the Indian Expedition.

In compliance with your order of Ap'l 5th. I reported myself
"forthwith" to the U.S. mustering officer at Ft. Leavenworth and
was "mustered into the service" on the 18th. of April. I "awaited
the orders from Genl Halleck" as directed but rec'd none. On the
20th. Ap'l I rec'd detailed

[Footnote 252: The promotion of Blunt to a brigadier-generalship had
caused surprise and some opposition. Referring to it, the _Daily
Conservative_, April 12, 1862, said, "Less than three months ago
Mr. Lincoln informed a gentleman from this State that no Kansas man
would be made a Brigadier 'unless the Kansas Congressional delegation
was unanimously and strenuously in his favor' ... Either the President
has totally changed his policy or Lane, Pomeroy and Conway are
responsible for this most unexpected and unprecedented appointment
..."]

[Footnote 253: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 370.]

[Footnote 254: Indian Office General Files, _Southern
Superintendency_, 1859-1862, F 363 of 1862.]

instructions from Adjt. Gen'l Thomas, authorizing me to proceed
and raise "from the loyal Indians now in Kansas a Regiment of
Infantry." I immediately repaired to this place and in a very
few days enrolled a sufficient number of Indians to form a
minimum[255] Regiment. I am particularly indebted to the Agts.
Maj. Cutler of the Creeks and Maj. Snow of the Seminoles, for
their valuable services. Immediately after the enrolling, and
in compliance with my instructions from Adjt. Gen'l Thomas, I
notified Lieut. Chas. S. Bowman U.S. mustering officer at Ft.
Leavenworth of the fact, to which I have rec'd no answer.

At this point in my procedure a special messenger from Gen'l
Sturgis reached this place with a copy of his "Order No. 8," a
copy of which I herewith send you. On the next day Maj. Minor in
command at Iola, Kansas, and who had been furnished with a copy of
General Sturgis' "Order" came with a company of Cavalry to this
place "to look into matters." I showed him my authority, and
informed him what I had done. He made no arrest, seeming utterly
at a loss to understand the seemingly _confused_ state of
affairs. Whether Gen'l Sturgis will on the reception of my notice
at the Fort arrest me, or not, I know not. I have gone to the
limits of my instructions and deem it, if not my duty, prudent at
least to notify you of the condition of affairs, that you may be
the better enabled to remove obstacles, that the design of the
Department may be fully and promptly executed....[256]

[Footnote 255: The regiment, according to the showing of the muster
roll, comprised one thousand nine men. Fifteen hundred was the more
usual number of a regiment, which, normally, had three battalions with
a major at the head of each.]

[Footnote 256: The remainder of the letter deals with the muster roll
of the First Regiment Indian Home Guards, which was forwarded to Dole,
under separate cover, the same day, and of which Dole acknowledged the
receipt, May 16, 1862 [Indian Office _Letter Book_, no. 68, pp.
240-241]. The roll shows the captain and number of each company as
here:

Company A Billy Bowlegs 106
Company B A-ha-luk-tus-ta-na-ke 100
Company C Tus-te-nu-ke-ema-ela 104
Company D Tus-te-nuk-ke 100
Company E Jon-neh (John) 101
Company F Mic-co-hut-ka (White Chief) 103
Company G Ah-pi-noh-to-me 103

(cont.)]

It soon developed that General Halleck had been equally at fault
in disregarding the wishes of the government with respect to the
mustering in of the loyal Indians. He had neglected to send on
to Kansas the instructions which he himself had received from
Washington.[257] It was incumbent, therefore, upon Blunt to ask for
new. He had found the enlisted Indians with no arms, except guns, no
shot pouches, no powder horns, although they were attempting to supply
themselves as best they could.[258] Blunt thought they ought to be
furnished with sheath, or bowie, knives; but the Indian Office had no
funds for such a purpose.[259] The new instructions, when they came,
were found to differ in no particular from those which had formerly
been issued. The Indian Home Guards were to constitute an irregular
force and were to be supported by such white troops, as Blunt should
think necessary. They were to be supplied with transportation and
subsistence and Blunt was to "designate the general to command."
Blunt's own appointment was expected to remove all difficulties that
had stood in the way of the Indian Expedition while under the control
of Halleck.[260] On

[Footnote 256: (cont.)

Company H Lo-ga-po-koh 94
Company I Jan-neh (John 100
Company J Lo-ka-la-chi-ha-go 98]

[Footnote 257: Coffin to Dole, May 8, 1862, Indian Office General
Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862.]

[Footnote 258: Same to Same, May 13, 1862, Ibid., Land Files,
_Southern Superintendency_, 1855-1870.]

[Footnote 259: Dole to Coffin, May 20, 1862, Ibid., _Letter
Book_, no. 68, p. 252.]

[Footnote 260: "I visited the War Department today to ascertain what
orders had been forwarded to you and your predecessor relative to the
organization of two thousand Indians as a home guard, which when
so organized would proceed to their homes in the Indian country in
company with a sufficient number of white troops to protect them at
their homes.

"I learn from Adjutant General Thomas that all necessary orders have
been forwarded to enable you to muster these Indian Regiments into the
service as an irregular force; and to send such white force with them
as (cont.)]

May 8 came the order from Adjutant-general Thomas, "Hurry up the
organization and departure of the two Indian regiments,"[261] which
indicated that there was no longer any question as to endorsement by
the Department of War.

As a matter of fact, the need for hurry was occasioned by the activity
of secessionists, Indians and white men, in southwest Missouri, which
would, of itself, suggest the inquiry as to what the Indian allies of
the Confederacy had been about since the Battle of Pea Ridge. Van
Dorn had ordered them to retire towards their own country and, while
incidentally protecting it, afford assistance to their white ally by
harassing the enemy, cutting off his supply trains, and annoying him
generally. The order had been rigidly attended to and the Indians had
done their fair share of the irregular warfare that terrorized and
desolated the border in the late spring of the second year of the war.
Not all of them, regularly enlisted, had participated in it, however;
for General Pike had, with a considerable part of his brigade, gone
away from the border as far as possible and had intrenched himself at
a fort of his own planning, Fort McCulloch, in the Choctaw Nation, on
the Blue River, a branch of the Red.[262] Furthermore,

[Footnote 260: (cont.) in your judgment may be deemed necessary, also
that the difficulties we experienced while the expedition was under
the control of Gen'l Halleck are now removed by your appointment, and
that you will designate the general to command the whole expedition
and see that such supplies for the transportation and subsistence as
may be necessary are furnished to the whole expedition (Indians as
well as whites). Lieut. Kile informs me that there was doubt whether
the Quarter Master would be expected to act as Commissary for
the Regiment. I suppose that you fully understand this was the
intention...."--Dole to Blunt, May 16, 1862, Indian Office _Letter
Book_, no. 68, pp. 241-242.]

[Footnote 261: _Daily Conservative_, May 9, 1862.]

[Footnote 262: "... General Albert Pike retreated from the battle of
Pea Ridge, Arkansas, a distance of 250 miles, and left his new-made
wards to the mercy (cont.)]

Colonel Drew and his men, later converts to secessionism, had, for a
good part of the time, contented themselves with guarding the Cherokee
Nation,[263] thus leaving Colonel Cooper and Colonel Stand Watie, with
their commands, to do most of the scouting and

[Footnote 262: (cont.) of war, stringing his army along through the
Cherokee, Creek and Choctaw Nations, passing through Limestone Gap, on
among the Boggies, and halted at Carriage Point, on the Blue, 'away
down along the Chickasaw line.' Cherokee Knights of the Golden Circle
followed Pike's retreat to Texas ... "--Ross, _Life and Times of
Hon. William P. Ross_, p. viii.]

[Footnote 263: These two letters from John Ross are offered in
evidence of this. They are taken from Indian Office Miscellaneous
Files, John Ross _Papers_:

(a)

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, PARK HILL, March 21st, 1862.

SIR: I am in receipt of your favor of the 23rd. inst. I have no doubt
that forage can be procured for Col. Drew's men in this vicinity by
hauling it in from the farms of the surrounding Districts. The subject
of a Delegate in Congress shall be attended to so soon as arrangements
can be made for holding an election. I am happy to learn that Col.
Drew has been authorized to furlough a portion of the men in his
Regiment to raise corn. I shall endeavor to be correctly informed of
the movements of the enemy and advise you of the same. And I shall be
gratified to receive any important information that you may have to
communicate at all times. I am very respectfully and truly, Yours,
etc. John Ross, _Prin'l Chief_, Cherokee Nation.

(b).

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, C.N. PARK HILL, April 10th, 1862.

SIR: I beg leave to thank you for your kind response to my letter of
the 22nd ulto and your order stationing Col. Drew's Regiment in this
vicinity. Though much reduced by furloughs in number it will be
useful for the particular purposes for which it was ordered here. The
unprotected condition of the country however is a source of general
anxiety among the People, who feel that they are liable to be overrun
at any time by small parties from the U.S. Army which remains in the
vicinity of the late Battle Ground. This is more particularly the case
since the removal of the Confederate Forces under your command and
those under Major Gen'l Price. Without distrusting the wisdom that has
prompted these movements, or the manifestation of any desire on my
part to enquire into their policy it will be nevertheless a source
of satisfaction to be able to assure the people of the country that
protection will not be withheld from them and that they will not
be left to their own feeble defense. Your response is respectfully
requested, I have the honor to be Sir with high regards, Your Obt
Servt. JOHN ROSS, _Prin'l Chief_, Cherokee Nation.

To Brig. Gen'l A. Pike Com'dg, Department Indian Territory, Head Qrs.
Choctaw Nation.]

skirmishing. So kindly did the Indians take to that work that Colonel
Cooper recommended[264] their employment as out-and-out guerrillas.
That was on May 6 and was probably suggested by the fact that, on
April 21, the Confederate government had definitely authorized the
use of partisan rangers.[265] A good understanding of Indian military
activity, at this particular time, is afforded by General Pike's
report[266] of May 4,

... The Cherokee[267] and Creek troops are in their respective
countries. The Choctaw troops are in front of me, in their
country, part on this side of Boggy and part at Little Boggy, 34
miles from here. These observe the roads to Fort Smith and by
Perryville toward Fort Gibson. Part of the Chickasaw battalion is
sent to Camp McIntosh, 11 miles this side of the Wichita Agency,
and part to Fort Arbuckle, and the Texan company is at Fort Cobb.

I have ordered Lieutenant-colonel Jumper with his Seminoles to
march to and take Fort Larned, on the Pawnee Fork of the Arkansas,
where are considerable stores and a little garrison. He will go as
soon as their annuity is paid.

The Creeks under Colonel McIntosh are about to make an extended
scout westward. Stand Watie, with his Cherokees, scouts along the
whole northern line of the Cherokee country from Grand Saline to
Marysville, and sends me information continually of every movement
of the enemy in Kansas and Southwestern Missouri.

The Comanches, Kiowas, and Reserve Indians are all peaceable and
quiet. Some 2,000 of the former are encamped about three days'
ride from Fort Cobb, and some of them come in at intervals to
procure provisions. They have sent to me to know

[Footnote 264: Cooper to Van Dorn, May 6, 1862, _Official
Records_, vol. xiii, 823-824.]

[Footnote 265: _Journal of the Congress of the Confederate
States_, vol. v, 285.]

[Footnote 266: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 819-823.]

[Footnote 267: This situation, so eminently satisfactory to John Ross,
did not continue long, however, and on May 10, the Cherokee Principal
Chief had occasion to complain that his country had been practically
divested of a protecting force and, at the very moment, too, when the
Federals were showing unwonted vigor near the northeastern border
[Ross to Davis, May 10, 1862, _Official Records_, vol. xiii,
824-825].]

if they can be allowed to send a strong party and capture any
trains on their way from Kansas to New Mexico, to which I have no
objection. To go on the war-path somewhere else is the best way to
keep them from troubling Texas ...

Stand Watie's scouting had brought him, April 26,[268] into a slight
action with men of the First Battalion First Missouri Cavalry at
Neosho, in the vicinity of which place he lingered many days and where
his men[269] again fought, in conjunction with Colonel Coffee's, May
31.[270] The skirmish of the later date was disastrous to the Federals
under Colonel John M. Richardson of the Fourteenth Missouri State
Militia Cavalry and proved to be a case where the wily and nimble
Indian had taken the Anglo-Saxon completely by surprise.[271] From
Neosho, Stand Watie moved down, by slow and destructive stages,
through Missouri and across into Indian Territory. His next important
engagement was at Cowskin Prairie, June 6.

Meanwhile, the organization of the Indian Expedition, or Indian Home
Guard, as it was henceforth most commonly styled, was proceeding
apace.[272] The

[Footnote 268: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 61-63; Britton,
_Civil War on the Border_, vol. i, 281-282.]

[Footnote 269: Stand Watie's whole force was not engaged and he,
personally, was not present. Captain Parks led Watie's contingent and
was joined by Coffee.]

[Footnote 270: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 90-92, 94-95.]

[Footnote 271:--Ibid., 92-94, 409. Watie, although not
present, seems to have planned the affair [Ibid., 95].
Lieutenant-colonel Mills, who reported upon the Neosho engagement, was
of the opinion that "the precipitate flight" of the Federals could
be accounted for only upon the supposition that the "screaming and
whooping of the Indians" unnerved them and "rendered their untrained
horses nearly unmanageable."--Ibid., 93.]

[Footnote 272: The progress in organization is indicated by these
communications to the Indian Office:

(a).

The enrollment, organizing etc. etc. of the Indians, and preparations
for their departure, are progressing satisfactorily, though as I
anticipated, it will be difficult to raise two Regiments, and I have
some fears of our success in getting the full number for the 2nd
Regiment. But if we get one full company of Delawares and Shawnees,
(cont.)]

completion of the first regiment gave little concern. It was composed
of Creeks and Seminoles, eight companies of the former and two of the
latter. The second regiment was miscellaneous in its composition and
took longer to

[Footnote 272: (cont.) as promised, and four companies of Osages,
which the chiefs say they can raise, I think we shall succeed.

Two Regiments of white troops and Rabb's Battery have already started
and are down by this time in the Cherokee Nation. Col. Doubleday, who
is in command, has notified the officers here to prepare with all
possible despatch, for marching orders. We are looking for Aliens
Battery here this week and if it comes I hope to make considerable
addition to the Army from the loyal Refugee Indians here, as they have
great confidence in "_them waggons that shoot_," this has been a
point with them all the time.

We were still feeding those that are mustered in and shall I suppose
have to do so until the requisitions arive. The Dellawares and
Shaw-nees also, I had to make arrangements to feed from the time of
their arrival at the Sac and Fox Agency. But from all the indications
now we expect to see the whole Expedition off in ten days or two
weeks.--Coffin to Dole, June 4, 1862, Indian Office General Files,
_Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862, C 1661.

(b).

It has been some time since I wrote you and to fill my promise I again
drop you a line. I presume you feel a lively interest in whatever
relates to the Indians. The 1st. Regt. is now mustered into the
service and will probably to-day number something over a minimum Regt.
It is composed entirely of Creeks and Seminoles, eight companys of the
former and two of the latter.

I have understood that the report of the Creek Agent gave the number
of Creek men at 1990--If this is a fact it is far from a correct
statement--The actual number of Creek men over 14 years of age
(refugees) will not number over 900. Some of these are unable to be
soldiers. The actual number of Seminoles (men) will not excede 300
over 14 years of age, many of them are old and disabled as soldiers.
Thus you will see that but one Regt. could be raised from that
quarter. You are aware that the Creeks and Seminoles speak one
language nearly and are thus naturally drawn together and they were
not willing to be divided.

The second regt. is now forming from the various other tribes and I
have no doubt will be filled, it would have been filled long ago, but
Col. Ritchie did not repair here for a long time in fact not till
after our Regt. was raised--Adjutant Dole came here promptly to do his
duty--but in the absence of his Col. could not facilitate his regt.
without assuming a responsibility that would have been unwise. I
regret that he could not have been placed in our regt. for he will
prove a faithful and reliable officer and should I be transfered to
(cont.)]

organize, largely because its prospective commander, Colonel John
Ritchie, who had gone south to persuade the Osages to enlist,[273] was
slow in putting in an appearance at Humboldt. The Neosho Agency, to
which the Osages belonged, was in great confusion, partly due to

[Footnote 272: (cont.) any other position which I am strongly in hopes
I may be, I hope you will exercise your influence to transfer him
to my place, this will be agreable to all the officers of the 1st.
regiment and desirable on his part.

The condition of the Indians here at the present writing is very
favorable, sickness is abating and their spirits are reviving. I
think I have fully settled the fact of the Indians capability and
susceptibility to arive at a good state of military disipline. You
would be surprised to see our Regt. move. They accomplish the feat of
regular time step equal to any white soldier, they form in line with
dispatch and with great precission; and what is more they now manifest
a great desire to learn the entire white man's disiplin in military
matters. That they will make brave and ambitious soldiers I have no
doubt. Our country may well feel proud that these red men have at
last fell into the ranks to fight for our flag, and aid in crushing
treason. Much honor is due them. I am sorry that Dr. Kile did
not accept the appointment of Quartermaster but owing to some
misunderstanding with Col. Ritchie he declines.

You will please remember me to Gen'l Lane and say that I have not
heard from him since I left Washington.--A.C. ELITHORPE to Dole, June
9, 1862, Indian Office General Files, _Southern Superintendency_,
1859-1862, C 1661.

(c).

The Indian Brigade, consisting of about one thousand Creeks and
Seminoles, sixty Quapaws, sixty Cherokees and full companies of wild
Delawares, Kechees, Ironeyes, Cadoes, and Kickapoos, left this place
(Leroy) yesterday for Humboldt, at which place I suppose they will
join the so much talked of Indian expedition. Although I have not as
yet fully ascertained the exact number of each Tribe, represented in
said Brigade, but they may be estimated at about Fifteen Hundred,
all of the Southern Refugee Indians who have been fed here by the
Government, besides sixty Delawares from the Delaware Reservation, and
about two Hundred Osages, the latter of which I have been assured will
be increased to about four or five hundred, ere they get through the
Osage Nation ...

The news from the Cherokee Nation is very cheering and encouraging; it
has been reported that nearly Two Thousand Cherokees will be ready to
join the expedition on its approach into that country....--Coffin to
Dole, June 15, 1862, Ibid., C 1684.]

[Footnote 273: Coffin to Dole, June 4, 1862, Ibid.,
_Neosho_, C 1662 of 1862. See also Carruth to Coffin, September
19, 1862, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, _Report_, 1862,
164-166.]

the fact that, at this most untoward moment, the Osages were being
approached for a cession of lands, and partly to the fact that
Indians of the neighborhood, of unionist sympathies, Cherokees and
Delawares[274] from the Cherokee country, Shawnees, Quapaws,[275] and
Seneca-Shawnees, were being made refugees, partly, also, to the fact
that Agent Elder and Superintendent Coffin were not working in harmony
with each other. Their differences dated from the first days of their
official relationship. Elder had been influential, for reasons most
satisfactory to himself and not very complimentary to Coffin,
in having the Neosho Agency transferred to the Central
Superintendency.[276] Coffin had vigorously objected and with such
effect that, in March, 1862, a retransfer had been ordered;[277] but
not before Coffin had reported[278] that everything was now amicable
between him and Elder. Elder was evidently of a different opinion and
before long was asking to be allowed again to report officially
to Superintendent Branch at St. Joseph.[279] There was a regular
tri-weekly post between that place and Fort Scott, Elder's present
headquarters, and the chances were good that Branch would be in a
position to attend to mail more promptly than was Coffin.[280] The
counter arguments

[Footnote 274: F. Johnson to Dole, April 2, 1862, Indian Office,
_Central Superintendency_, Delaware, J 627 of 1862.]

[Footnote 275: The propriety of permitting the refugee Quapaws to
"return to their homes by accompanying the military expedition" was
urged upon the Indian Office in a letter from Elder to Coffin, May
29, 1862 [Coffin to Dole, June 4, 1862, Ibid., _Southern
Superintendency_, Neosho, C 1663 of 1862].]

[Footnote 276: Office letter of June 5, 1861.]

[Footnote 277: Mix to Branch, March 1, 1862, Indian Office _Letter
Book_, no. 67.]

[Footnote 278: Coffin to Dole, February 28, 1862, Ibid.,
General Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862, C 1541 of
1862.]

[Footnote 279: Elder to Dole, May 16, 1862, Ibid., Neosho, E
106 of 1862.]

[Footnote 280: Coffin was spending a good deal of his time at Leroy.
Leroy was one hundred twenty-five miles, so Elder computed, from
Leavenworth, where he (cont.)]

of Coffin[281] were equally plausible and the request for transfer
refused.

The outfit for the Indians of the Home Guard was decidedly inferior.
Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la wanted batteries, "wagons that shoot."[282] His
braves, many of them, were given guns that were worthless, that would
not shoot at all.[283] In such a way was their eagerness to learn the
white man's method of fighting and to acquire his discipline rewarded.
The fitting out was done at Humboldt, although Colonel William
Weer[284] of the Tenth Kansas Infantry, who was the man finally
selected to command the entire force, would have preferred it done at
Fort Scott.[285] The Indians had a thousand and one excuses for not
expediting matters. They seemed to have a deep-seated distrust of what
the Federal intentions regarding them might be when

[Footnote 280: (cont.) directed his mail, and sixty or seventy from
Fort Scott. His communications were held up until Coffin happened to
go to Leavenworth. Moreover, Coffin was then expecting to go soon
"into the Indian country."]

[Footnote 281: Coffin complained that Elder neglected his duties. It
was Coffin's intention to remove the headquarters of the Southern
Superintendency from Fort Scott to Humboldt. It would then be very
convenient for Elder to report to him, especially if he would go back
to his own agency headquarters and not linger, as he had been doing,
at Fort Scott [Coffin to Dole, June 10, 1862, Ibid., C 1668 of
1862.]]

[Footnote 282: _Daily Conservative_, May 10, 1862.]

[Footnote 283: Weer to Doubleday, June 6, 1862, _Official
Records_, vol. xiii, 418; Coffin to Dole, June 17, 1862, Indian
Office General Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862.]

[Footnote 284: Weer was one of the men in disfavor with Governor
Robinson [_Daily Conservative_, May 25, 1862]. He had been
arrested and his reinstatement to command that came with the
appearance of Blunt upon the scene was doubtless the circumstance that
afforded opportunity for his appointment to the superior command
of the Indian Expedition. Sturgis had refused to reinstate him. In
December, 1861, a leave of absence had been sought by Weer, who was
then with the Fourth Kansas Volunteers, in order that he might go
to Washington, D.C., and be a witness in the case involving Lane's
appointment as brigadier-general [Thomas to Hunter, December 12, 1861,
_Congressional Globe_, 37th congress, second session, part i,
128].]

[Footnote 285: Weer to Moonlight, June 6, 1862, _Official
Records_, vol. xiii, 419.]

once they should be back in their own country. They begged that some
assurance be given them of continued protection against the foe and
in their legal rights. And, in the days of making preparations, they
asked again and again for tangible evidence that white troops were
really going to support them in the journey southward.

The main portion of the Indian Expedition auxiliary white force had
all this time been more or less busy, dealing with bushwhackers and
the like, in the Cherokee Neutral Lands and in the adjoining counties
of Missouri. When Blunt took command of the Department of Kansas,
Colonel Frederick Salomon[286] of the Ninth Wisconsin Volunteer
Infantry was in charge at Fort Scott and the troops there or reporting
there were, besides eight companies of his own regiment, a part of
the Second Ohio Cavalry under Colonel Charles Doubleday, of the Tenth
Kansas Infantry under Colonel William F. Cloud, and the Second Indiana
Battery.[287] Blunt's first thought was to have Daubleday[288] lead
the Indian Expedition, the auxiliary white force of which was to be
selected from the regiments at Fort Scott. Doubleday accordingly made
his plans, rendezvoused his men, and arranged that the mouth of Shoal
Creek should be a rallying point and temporary headquarters;[289] but
events were already in train for Colonel

[Footnote 286: Salomon was born in Prussia in 1826 [Rosengarten,
_The German Soldier in the Wars of the United States_, 150]. He
had distinguished himself in some of the fighting that had taken place
in Missouri in the opening months of the war and, when the Ninth
Wisconsin Infantry, composed solely of German-Americans, had been
recruited, he was called to its command [Love, _Wisconsin in the War
of the Rebellion_, 578].]

[Footnote 287: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 371-372, 377.]

[Footnote 288: for an account of Doubleday's movements in April that
very probably gained him the place, see Britton, _Civil War on the
Border_, vol. i, 296.]

[Footnote 289: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 397, 408.]

Weer to supersede him and for his own assignment to the Second Brigade
of the expedition.

Previous to his supersedure by Weer, Doubleday conceived that it might
be possible to reach Fort Gibson with ease,[290] provided the
attempt to do so should be undertaken before the various independent
secessionist commands could unite to resist.[291] That they were
planning to unite there was every indication.[292] Doubleday[293] was
especially desirous of heading off Stand Watie who was still hovering
around in the neighborhood of his recent adventures, and was believed
now to have an encampment on Cowskin Prairie near Grand River.
Accordingly, on the morning of June 6, Doubleday started out, with
artillery and a thousand men, and, going southward from Spring River,
reached the Grand about sundown.[294] Watie was three miles away
and, Doubleday continuing the pursuit, the two forces came to an
engagement. It was indecisive,[295] however, and Watie slipped away
under

[Footnote 290: Doubleday to Moonlight, May 25, 1862, _Official
Records_, vol. xiii, 397.]

[Footnote 291: Doubleday to Blunt, June 1, 1862, Ibid., 408.]

[Footnote 292: General Brown reported on this matter, June 2
[Ibid., 409] and June 4 [Ibid., 414], as did also
General Ketchum, June 3 [Ibid., 412]. They all seem to have had
some intimation that General Pike was to unite with Stand Watie as
well as Coffee and others, and that was certainly General Hindman's
intention. On May 31, the very day that he himself assumed command,
Hindman had ordered Pike to advance from Fort McCulloch to the Kansas
border. The order did not reach Pike until June 8 and was repeated
June 17 [Ibid., 40].]

[Footnote 293: The idea seems to have obtained among Missourians that
Doubleday was all this time inactive. They were either ignorant of or
intent upon ignoring the Indian Expedition. June 4, Governor Gamble
wrote to Secretary Stanton asking that the Second Ohio and the Ninth
Wisconsin, being at Fort Scott and unemployed, might be ordered to
report to Schofield [Ibid., 414, 438], who at the instance of
politicians and contrary to the wishes of Halleck [Ibid., 368]
had been given an independent command in Missouri.]

[Footnote 294: Doubleday to Weer, June 8, 1862 [Ibid., 102].]

[Footnote 295: Doubleday reported to Weer that it was a pronounced
success, so did Blunt to Schofield [Ibid., 427]; but subsequent
events showed that it was (cont.)]

cover of the darkness. Had unquestioned success crowned Doubleday's
efforts, all might have been well; but, as it did not, Weer, who had
arrived at Fort Scott[296] a few days before and had been annoyed
to find Doubleday gone, ordered him peremptorily to make no further
progress southward without the Indians. The Indian contingent had in
reality had a set-back in its preparations. Its outfit was incomplete
and its means for transportation not forthcoming.[297] Under such
circumstances, Weer advised the removal of the whole concern to Fort
Scott, but that was easier said than done, inasmuch, as before any
action was taken, the stores were _en route_ for Humboldt.[298]
Nevertheless, Weer was determined to have the expedition start before
Stand Watie could be reinforced by Rains.[299] Constant and insistent
were the reports that the enemy was massing its forces to destroy the
Indian Expedition.[300]

[Footnote 295: (cont.) anything but that and the _Daily
Conservative_ tried to fix the blame upon Weer [Weer to Moonlight,
June 23, 1862, Ibid., 446]. The newspaper account of the whole
course of affairs may be given, roughly paraphrased, thus: Doubleday,
knowing, perhaps, that Weer was to supersede him and that his time for
action was short, "withdrew his detachment from Missouri, concentrated
them near Iola, Kansas, and thence directed them to march to the
mouth of Shoal Creek, on Spring River, himself taking charge of the
convoying of a train of forty days supplies to the same place ..." He
arrived June 4. Then, "indefatigible in forwarding the preparations
for a blow upon the camp of organization which the rebels had occupied
unmolested on Cowskin Prairie," he made his plans for further advance.
At that moment came the news that Weer had superseded him and had
ordered him to stop all movement south. He disregarded the order and
struck, even though not fully prepared [_Daily Conservative_,
June 13, 1862].]

[Footnote 296: Weer to Moonlight, June 5, 1862, _Official
Records_, vol. xiii, 418.]

[Footnote 297:--Ibid.; Weer to Doubleday, June 6, 1862,
Ibid., 418-419.]

[Footnote 298: Weer to Moonlight, June 13, 1862, Ibid., 430.]

[Footnote 299: Same to same, June 7, 1862, Ibid., 422.]

[Footnote 300: The destruction of the Indian Expedition was most
certainly the occasion for the massing, notwithstanding the fact that
Missourians were apprehensive for the safety of their state only and
wanted to have Weer's white troops diverted to its defence. Curtis,
alone, of the commanders in Missouri seems to have surmised rightly in
the matter [Curtis to Schofield, Ibid., 432].]

Weer, therefore, went on ahead to the Osage Catholic Mission and
ordered the Fort Scott troops to meet him there. His purpose was to
promote the enlistment of the Osages, who were now abandoning the
Confederate cause.[301] He would then go forward and join Doubleday,
whom he had instructed to clear the way.[302]

Weer's plans were one thing, his embarrassments, another. Before the
middle of June he was back again at Leroy,[303] having left Salomon
and Doubleday[304] at Baxter Springs on the west side of Spring
River in the Neutral Lands, the former in command. Weer hoped by his
presence at Leroy to hurry the Indians along; for it was high time the
expedition was started and he intended to start it, notwithstanding
that many officers were absent from their posts and the men of
the Second Indian Regiment not yet mustered in. It was absolutely
necessary, if anything were going to be done with Indian aid, to get
the braves away from under the influence of their chiefs, who were
bent upon delay and determent. By the sixteenth he had the warriors
all ready at Humboldt,[305] their bullet-proof medicine taken, their
grand war dance indulged in. By the twenty-first, the final packing
up began,[306] and it was not long thereafter before the Indian
Expedition, after having experienced so many vicissitudes, had
definitely materialized and was on its way south. Accompanying Weer
were the Reverend Evan Jones, entrusted with

[Footnote 301: Weer to Moonlight, June 13, 1862.]

[Footnote 302: Weer to Doubleday, June 6, 1862.]

[Footnote 303: Weer to Moonlight, June 13, 1862.]

[Footnote 304: On the twentieth, General Brown requested Salomon to
send Doubleday to southwest Missouri [_Official Records_, vol.
xiii, 440] and Salomon so far complied with the request as to post
some companies of Doubleday's regiment, under Lieutenant-colonel
Ratliff, at Neosho [Ibid., 445, 459].]

[Footnote 305:--Ibid., 434.]

[Footnote 306:--Ibid., 441.]

a confidential message[307] to John Ross, and two special Indian
agents, E.H. Carruth, detailed at the instance of the Indian Office,
and H.W. Martin, sent on Coffin's own responsibility, their particular
task being to look out for the interests and welfare of the Indians
and, when once within the Indian Territory, to take careful stock of
conditions there, both political and economic.[308] The Indians were
in fine spirits and, although looking

[Footnote 307: The message, addressed to "Mutual Friend," was an
assurance of the continued interest of the United States government
in the inhabitants of Indian Territory and of its determination to
protect them [Coffin to Ross, June 16, 1862, Indian Office General
Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862, C 1684].]

[Footnote 308: "... You will assure all loyal Indians in the Indian
Territory of the disposition and the ability of the Government of the
United States to protect them in all their rights, and that there is
no disposition on the part of said government to shrink from any of
its Treaty Obligations with all such of the Indian Tribes, who
have been, are now, and remaining loyal to the same. Also that the
government will, at the earliest practicable period, which is
believed not to be distant, restore to all loyal Indians the rights,
privileges, and immunities, that they have enjoyed previous to the
present unfortunate rebellion.

"If, during the progress of the Army you should find Indians in a
suffering condition whose loyalty is _beyond doubt_, you will,
on consultation with the officers, render such assistance, as you may
think proper, with such aid as the officers may render you.

"You will carefully look into the condition of the country, ascertain
the quantity of Stock, Hogs, and Cattle, also the quantity of Corn,
wheat etc. which may be in the hands of the loyal Indians, and the
amount of the crops in the ground the present season, their condition
and prospects.

"You are requested to communicate with me at this office at every
suitable opportunity on all the above mentioned points, in order to
enable me to keep the Hon. Com'r of Indian Aff'rs well advised of the
condition of affairs in the Indian Territory, and that the necessary
steps may be taken at the earliest possible moment, consistent with
safety and economy, to restore the loyal Indians now in Kansas to
their homes.

"Should any considerable number of the Indians, now in the Army,
remain in the Indian Territory, or join you from the loyal Indians,
now located therein you will very probably find it best, to remain
with them, until I can get there with those, who are now here. But of
these matters you will be more able to judge on the ground."--Extract
from Coffin's instructions to Carruth, June 16, 1862, Ibid.,
Similar instructions, under date of June 23, 1862, were sent to H.W.
Martin.]

somewhat ludicrous in their uniforms,[309] were not much behind their
comrades of the Ninth and Tenth Kansas[310] in earnestness and in
attention to duty.[311] Nevertheless, they had been very reluctant to
leave their families and were, one and all, very apprehensive as to
the future.

[Footnote 309: "I have just returned from Humboldt--the army there
under Col. Weer consisting of the 10th Kansas Regiment 4 Companys of
the 9th Kansas Aliens Battery of Six Tenths Parrot Guns and the first
and second Indian Regements left for the Indian Territory in good
stile and in fine spirits the Indians with their new uniforms and
small Military caps on their Hugh Heads of Hair made rather a Comecal
Ludecrous apperance they marched off in Columns of 4 a breast singing
the war song all joining in the chourse and a more animated seen is
not often witnessed. The officers in command of the Indian Regements
have labored incessantly and the improvement the Indians have made in
drilling is much greater than I supposed them capabell of and I think
the opinion and confidence of all in the eficency of the Indian
Regements was very much greater when they left than at any previous
period and I have little doubt that for the kind of service that will
be required of them they will be the most efecient troops in the
Expedition."--COFFIN to Dole, June 25, 1862, Indian Office General
Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862, C 1684.]

[Footnote 310: Weer took with him as white anxiliary "the Tenth
Kansas, Allen's battery, three companies Ninth Kansas..." [_Official
Records_, vol. xiii, 441]. It seems to have been his intention to
take the Second Kansas also; but that regiment was determined to stay
at Humboldt until it had effected a change in its colonels in favor of
Owen A. Bassett [Ibid., 434].]

[Footnote 311: Weer was disgusted with conditions surrounding his
white force. This is his complaint, on the eve of his departure:

"Commissions to officers from the Governor are pouring in daily. I am
told that the Tenth is rapidly becoming a regiment of officers. To add
to these difficulties there are continual intrigues, from colonels
down, for promotions and positions of command. Officers are leaving
their posts for Fort Leavenworth and elsewhere to engage in these
intrigues for more prominent places. The camps are filled with rumors
of the success of this or that man. Factions are forming, and a
general state of demoralization being produced..."--WEER to Moonlight,
June 21, 1862, Ibid., 441-442.]